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LONG-TERM ORIENTATION IN FAMILY AND NON-FAMILY FIRMS:  
A BAYESIAN ANALYSIS 
 
ABSTRACT 
A stronger long-term orientation is considered a competitive advantage of family firms relative 
to non-family firms. In this study, we use panel data of U.S. firms and analyze this proposition. 
Our findings are surprising. Only in when the family is involved in the management of the firm 
is the firm found to invest more in long-term projects relative to a non-family firm. We also find 
that investment in long-term projects in family firms is determined less by cash flow variations 
than for non-family firms. Managerial implications of our findings are discussed. Our hypotheses 
are tested using Bayesian methods. 
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Most firms around the world are family-owned (e.g., Becht & Roell, 1999; Faccio & 
Lang, 2002; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 1999; Shleifer & Vishny, 1986), and a 
growing number of studies compares family and non-family firms in terms of financial perform-
ance (e.g., Andersen & Reeb, 2003; Barontini & Caprio, 2005; Villalonga & Amit, 2005). For 
large U.S. corporations, the evidence is mixed. For example, Holdernees and Sheenan (1988) 
find that family firms have a lower market-to-book value; Andersen and Reeb (2003) find the 
opposite to be true. A stronger long-term orientation is considered an explanation as to why fam-
ily firms might perform better than non-family firms. For example, Andersen and Reeb (2003) 
note that “families potentially have longer horizons than other shareholders, suggesting a will-
ingness to invest in long-term projects relative to shorter managerial horizons” (Andersen & 
Reeb, 2003: 1305) (for this argument, see also James, 1999; Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2005; 
and Le Breton-Miller & Miller, 2006). In this paper, we aim to determine whether this argument 
is true and analyze whether family firms pursue a more long-term oriented strategy than non-
family firms. 
To address this question, we created a panel data set of large publicly-traded U.S. family 
and non-family firms for the years 1994-1999. We used data on R&D and capital expenditures as 
proxies for investment in long-term projects and analyzed the R&D and investment strategy of 
both types of firms using a Bayesian approach. Our findings were surprising. Only in the case of 
a member of the family as either CEO and/or chairman of the firm was the firm found to invest 
more in long-term projects compared to a non-family firm. We also found that investment in 
long-term projects in a family firm is determined less by cash flow variations compared to a non-
family firm. 
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This study makes three contributions to management research. First, we contribute to the 
literature on the performance of family and non-family firms. Even though a stronger long-term 
orientation is widely regarded as an explanation of why family firms might outperform non-
family firms (e.g., Andersen & Reeb, 2003; James, 1999; Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2005; Le 
Breton-Miller & Miller, 2006), empirical evidence (at least from large-scale quantitative data) on 
this issue is sparse. Our study aims to close this gap. Second, we contribute to the literature on 
the causes of managerial myopia (e.g., Jacobs, 1991; Laverty, 1996; Porter, 1992). Some of the 
explanations for managerial myopia such as managerial opportunism (Narajan, 1985; Hirshleifer 
& Thakor, 1994) or fluid and impatient capital (Porter, 1992) are unlikely to apply to family 
firms. By analyzing long-term orientation in family firms, we examine the validity of these ar-
guments. In this context, we also contribute to the literature on the relationship between owner-
ship and R&D expenditures (e.g., Bushee, 1998; David, Hitt, & Gimeno, 2001; Hansen & Hill, 
1991; Lee & O’Neill, 2003). Third, we use Bayesian regression analysis to test our hypotheses. 
So far, this method has rarely been used in management research (Hahn & Doh, 2006). In our 
analysis, we aim to demonstrate the usefulness of Bayesian methods in testing propositions of 
management theory. 
The remainder of the article presents a theoretical rationale for the influence of family 
ownership and/or management on long-term orientation and an empirical examination of this 
relationship. Implications of our findings are discussed from the perspectives of non-family 
shareholders and other stakeholders in family firms. 
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THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
In this section, we first summarize the literature on short-term behavior and then discuss why 
family firms might have a more long-term horizon relative to non-family firms. We develop hy-
potheses about the differences in long-term orientation between family and non-family firms. 
Intertemporal Choice and Managerial Myopia 
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, there was a prominent debate about economic short-terminism 
in the U.S. (Laverty, 1996). The claim was that U.S. firms were either unwilling or unable to 
make necessary investments for the future, which require a dismissal of short-term profits. This 
myopic behavior was claimed to place U.S. firms at a competitive disadvantage against firms 
from Germany or Japan, which were said to operate in a less myopic institutional environment 
(Jacobs, 1991; Porter, 1992). Although we do not want to delve too deep into this debate, we list 
some of the main arguments, as they also apply to the basic idea of our study: a comparison of 
long-term orientation in family and non-family firms. To understand these arguments, we need to 
introduce the concept of intertemporal choice. 
The idea of myopic behavior is strongly linked to the concept of intertemporal choice, a 
notion that is extensively studied in both economics and psychology (for a summary, see 
Loewenstein & Thaler, 1989). Generally, problems of intertemporal choice occur when costs and 
benefits of a particular decision are separated over time. Top-level management decisions, such 
as technology investments or entrance into a new market, often involve intertemporal choice. 
Echoing Laverty (1996), we define an intertemporal choice problem, as applied to management 
decisions, as a situation in which “the course of action that is best in the short term is not the 
same course of action that is best over the long run” (Laverty, 1996: 828). Generally, problems 
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of intertemporal choice involve a determination of the right balance between the long- and short-
term. In a normative economic approach (e.g., Fisher, 1930; von Neumann & Morgenstern, 
1953), this trade-off is solved by discounting future cash flows. This way, the problem is reduced 
to the discount rate that should be applied. Ceteris paribus—the use of a lower discount rate—
leads to a more long-term behavior and vice versa.1 
 Laverty (1996) classifies the explanations for short-terminism into five categories: (1) 
flawed management practice, (2) managerial opportunism, (3) stock market myopia, (4) fluid and 
impatient capital, and (5) information asymmetry. The flawed management practice explanation 
refers to the overuse of formal investment evaluation techniques (e.g., the discounted cash flow 
technique) which neglect intangible and hard-to-quantify payoffs (Hayes & Abernathy, 1980). 
Advocates of the managerial opportunism explanation argue that short-term behavior might be 
an optimal choice from a manager’s perspective. In moral hazard models, managers are shown to 
prefer to make short-term investments that pay off quickly to enhance personal reputation (Nara-
yanan, 1985), or that managers are preoccupied with job safety and therefore favor short-term 
relative to long-term payoffs (Hirshleifer & Thakor, 1992). Stock market myopia may also be a 
reason for managerial myopia. The argument is that the stock market undervalues a long-term 
oriented investment behavior, and, accordingly, managers are forced to think in the short-term to 
avoid the risk of a takeover (Stein,1988). Johnson and Kaplan (1987) argue that investment pro-
fessionals employed by financial investors focus too much on short-term figures in quarterly or 
annual reports. Similarly, Jacobs (1991) claims that when a stock is traded as a commodity, the 
owners of stock have less interest in waiting for long-term projects to pay off. This argument 
about the shortsightedness of capital markets is linked to the argument about fluid and impatient 
                                                 
1  It should be noted that other reasons for differences in discount rates exist, e.g., psychological anomalies in 
decision-making under risk (see, e.g., Benzion, Rapoport, & Yagil, 1989; Kahnemann & Tversky, 1979). 
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capital. Porter (1992) argues that underinvestment might be the result of the short-term relation-
ship between U.S. firms and the capital market. In contrast to Germany or Japan, where a large 
portion of equity is held by banks or (non-financial) firms, funds supplied in the U.S. often come 
from external capital providers (e.g., pension funds or other professional investment firms). Por-
ter (1992) argues that these external capital providers move their funds more quickly than other 
investors and therefore understand less about the individual companies’ long-run prospects. Fi-
nally, managerial myopia might also be explained by information asymmetry. In this explanation, 
managers know more about the firm than investors, and are forced to use strong short-term re-
sults as a signaling device for the quality of their management (Thakor, 1990). Interestingly, this 
argument holds regardless of managerial opportunism or stock market myopia. 
Literature on the Relation between Ownership and Managerial Myopia 
This subsection reviews the empirical literature on the relationship between managerial myopia 
and ownership structure. Most of the studies reviewed use R&D measures to analyze managerial 
myopia. This is not without problems. First, R&D data may also include many short-term pro-
jects (Laverty, 1993). Second, R&D does not always create economic value (Erickson & Jacob-
son, 1993; Hall, 1993). This latter aspect implies that R&D spending might, in fact, measure risk 
behavior rather than the willingness to invest in long-term projects. Despite these shortcomings, 
R&D is the most widely used proxy for measuring myopic behavior at the firm level. 
A number of scholars analyzed the role of institutional investors in formulating the firm’s 
R&D strategy. Their main finding was that, generally, institutional investors influence managers 
to invest more in R&D and thereby help to mitigate the managerial myopia problem (e.g., 
Baysinger, Kosnik, & Turk, 1991; Bushee, 1998; David et al., 2001; Hansen & Hill, 1991). 
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However, this effect is found to vary by the type of institutional investor2 and shareholder activ-
ism3. Comparing the U.S. and Japan, Lee and O’Neill (2003) find that the level of ownership 
concentration has a positive impact on R&D spending for firms in the U.S., but not for firms in 
Japan. They conclude that agency theory represents U.S. firms adequately, whereas stewardship 
theory better explains the situation in Japanese firms. We do not know of any study that analyzes 
the impact of family ownership and/or family management on R&D expenditures. 
Long-term Orientation: Why Might Family Firms Be Different? 
In this sub-section, we discuss why family firms might be more long-term-oriented than non-
family firms. We proceed in two steps: first, we regard the perspective of the family as being the 
main shareholder. Second, we discuss the relationship between management and owners in fam-
ily versus non-family firms. We use arguments from agency and stewardship theory alike, and, 
whenever possible, relate our arguments to the explanations for short-terminism mentioned 
above, as well as to family business research. 
Family versus non-family shareholders. For firms that have a family as their main 
shareholder, the explanations for short-terminism that involve stock market myopia (e.g., Jacobs, 
1991; Johnson & Kaplan, 1987) or fluid and impatient capital (e.g., Porter, 1992) are of less 
relevance for two reasons. First, from the perspective of a family shareholder, the firm is not just 
an asset which might be sold easily, as the firm symbolizes the heritage and tradition of the fam-
ily and is therefore part of the family identity.4 Consequently, family shareholders intend to pass 
the firm over to the next family generation (e.g., Casson, 1999; Guzzo & Abbot, 1990; Tagiuri & 
                                                 
2  Bushee (1998) finds that institutional investors who have a high portfolio turnover and engage in short-term 
trading actually increase the probability of managers reducing R&D. 
3  David, Hitt, and Gimeno (2001) find that institutional ownership alone is insufficient to have an effect. Activ-
ism on the part of these investors is required to make managers investing more in R&D. 
4  See Pratt (1998) for the psychological concept of identification. 
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Davis, 1992). Second, the reputation of the family in the public is strongly linked to the well-
being of the firm (Dyer & Whetten, 2006). This becomes even more evident as the firm often 
bears the family’s name. For these two reasons, families as shareholders should be less likely 
than other types of shareholders to move their funds around quickly and be less likely to evaluate 
their investment only in terms of short-term results. The theory of psychological ownership 
might also help to explain differences between family and non-family shareholders. Pierce, 
Kostova, and Dirks (2001) define psychological ownership as “the feeling of possessiveness and 
of being psychologically tied to an object” (Pierce, Kostova, & Dirks, 2001: 299). A root of psy-
chological ownership is in the control of the particular object that one owns. We argue that this 
applies more for family- than for non-family shareholders. In contrast to non-family sharehold-
ers, family-shareholders often have a close link to management (often by kinship ties). This close 
link allows them to explore and alter the firm and its environment. As a result, they have a 
greater feeling of being psychologically tied to the firm relative to non-family shareholders. This 
psychological connection should prevent them from moving their funds around quickly. 
In the next two subsections, we discuss the relationship between management and share-
holders in family versus non-family firms. We use arguments from both agency and stewardship 
theory. 
 Management in family and non-family firms: arguments from agency theory. Agency 
theory may be used to explain differences in investment behavior between family and non-family 
firms. These arguments from agency theory relate in a direct way to the managerial opportunism 
and information asymmetry explanation of short-term behavior. Agency theory is widely used to 
explain the relationship between management and owners of a firm (Fama, 1980; Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976; for a summary, see Eisenhardt, 1989). It describes managers as rational actors, 
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who seek to maximize their individual utility (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Although this main 
assumption has its critics—even among agency theorists themselves (e.g., Jensen & Meckling, 
1994)—this theory is a useful benchmark when explaining a relationship in which the respective 
parties’ interests are at odds. From an agency theorist’s perspective, the relationship between 
management and owners is fundamentally different in family and non-family firms. We argue 
that the incentive to invest in a long-term project is higher in a family firm relative to a non-
family firm. Within the group of family firms, we differentiate between those family firms gov-
erned by family managers and those governed by professional non-family managers. Profes-
sional non-family managers are defined as persons who hold a management position in a family 
firm, but who are not related to the owning family by blood, marriage or adoption (v. Schulzen-
dorff, 1984; Klein & Bell, 2007). Considering this distinction, we compare three different types 
of firms: (1) family-owned firms governed by family managers; (2) family-owned firms gov-
erned by professional non-family managers; and (3) non-family firms. 
In the first case, the argument is simple: in a family-owned firm governed by family man-
agers, managerial opportunism should be less of a problem, because no (or only minor) agency 
conflicts exist5; the utility functions of shareholders and management coincide to a large degree. 
This argument is even stronger given the fact that most family managers own a substantial share 
of the company they manage. In this case, they resemble owner-managers where no agency con-
flicts exist between owners and management (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Another argument 
against the risk of managerial opportunism is that family managers have rather safe jobs com-
pared to managers in non-family firms (e.g., Le Breton-Miller & Miller, 2006; Ward, 2004). 
They do not need to increase their reputation via strong short-term results. The information 
                                                 
5  Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino, and Buchholtz (2001) argue the opposite: family firms are exposed to a self-control 
problem. Thus, they have a strong incentive to invest resources to curb this kind of opportunism. 
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asymmetry explanation of short-terminism is also less likely to apply. Family shareholders have 
often known the business and its (family) managers for a long time. They have a profound un-
derstanding of the business. Signaling via strong short-term results is therefore less attractive for 
the non-family manager. 
For a family-owned firm governed by professional non-family managers, the argument is 
less straightforward. Contrary to family managers, professional non-family managers in family-
owned firms have an incentive to engage in managerial opportunism. Their utility function does 
not always coincide with the utility function of the family owners. They are also less likely to 
have a significant ownership share in the company. Still, two arguments support the view that 
firms with family shareholders governed by professional non-family managers are more long-
term oriented than “pure” non-family firms: first, incentives for monitoring are higher, because 
the owning families are strongly linked to their firm by feelings of identity and its reputation 
outside the organization. In addition, as their fractions of ownerships are typically higher, (eco-
nomic) benefits from monitoring are also higher; a free-rider problem associated with firms that 
have only dispersed shareholders is unlikely (Fama, 1980; Maug, 1998). As a result, managers 
have less latitude to engage in managerial opportunism. Second, information asymmetry between 
owners and management is less of a problem. There is less need to use strong short-term results 
as a signaling device because the owning family knows the business and has a good, long-term 
understanding of the business. 
A non-family firm fits the situation described in the model of Jensen and Meckling 
(1976). Managers of a non-family firm have a strong incentive to engage in short-term behaviors 
that produce strong short-term results. This way, they secure their job within the firm and in-
crease their value on the market for professional executives (Narayanan, 1985). Also, the infor-
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mation asymmetry explanation seems relevant. As shareholders of a non-family firm are not 
linked to the firm by tradition or heritage, they are likely to move their funds around more 
quickly than shareholders who are linked to their firm by family ties. As a consequence, they 
should have less understanding of the underlying business model and are more likely to pay at-
tention to short-term results. That is why managers in a non-family firm should be more likely to 
use strong short-term results as signaling devices for their management quality than managers in 
a family firm. 
 Management in family and non-family firms: arguments from stewardship theory. 
Stewardship theory is rooted in psychology and sociology and describes situations where execu-
tives that act as stewards are motivated to behave in the best interests of a company’s owners 
(Davis, Schoorman, & Donaldson, 1997; Donaldson & Davis, 1991). Stewardship theory is use-
ful when describing the relationship between management and owners in a family firm (e.g., 
Eddleston & Kellermanns, 2007). The model of man that underlies stewardship theory is funda-
mentally different from the model of man that underlies agency theory. The behavior of indi-
viduals in stewardship theory is ordered in a way that grants pro-organizational, collectivist be-
havior a higher utility than individualistic, self-serving behavior (Davis et al., 1997). Conse-
quently, the managerial opportunism explanation for short-term behavior becomes meaningless. 
Davis and coauthors (1997) propose factors that lead individuals to act as pro-organizational, 
collectivist stewards rather than as individualistic, self-serving agents. They differentiate be-
tween psychological and situational factors. We argue that some of these factors are more likely 
to be found in family firms relative to non-family firms. 
Davis and coauthors (1997) argue that people who are high in identification with the or-
ganization or high in value commitment are more likely to act as stewards rather than as agents. 
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For family managers, the argument is simple. As the firm is part of the family identity, family 
managers strongly identify with the firm. In addition, family managers are also likely to believe 
in and accept the firms’ goals, which are shaped to a large degree by the owning families. Con-
sequently, value commitment should be higher. For the case of professional non-family manag-
ers working in a family-owned firm, the main argument is about selection. When employing pro-
fessional non-family managers, the owning family is likely to select these managers according to 
the two criteria: “identification” and “value commitment” (Chrisman, Chua, & Sharma, 1998). 
Regarding situational factors, Davis and coauthors (1997) propose that people who are in 
an involvement-oriented rather than in a control-oriented situation are more likely to behave as 
stewards. This proposition refers to Lawler (1986) and his differentiation between control-
oriented and involvement-oriented management philosophies. In a control-oriented approach, the 
thinking and controlling part of work is separated from the doing; in an involvement-oriented 
approach, self-control and self-management are emphasized. In family-owned firms that are 
governed by family managers, the management philosophy is involvement-oriented. Two rea-
sons exist: first, shareholders and managers are members of the same family and are likely to 
trust one another, which reduces the need for control. Second, a sophisticated monitoring system 
would be of minor use. Only few possible sanctions exist, as it is hard to punish a member of 
your own family. With family-owned firms governed by professional non-family managers, the 
argument is again about selection. The owning family will carefully select the non-family man-
agers that run their business, and, by the point they have taken a decision, will trust them. On the 
other hand, as the reputation of the family depends on the development of the firm, there is a 
strong need for control. Considering this, it remains unclear whether an involvement-oriented or 
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control-oriented management philosophy applies in family-owned firms governed by profes-
sional non-family managers. 
 
Hypotheses 
To test our proposition that family firms might pursue a more long-term oriented business strat-
egy, we focus on two different particular aspects of long-term orientation. The first aspect con-
cerns the problem of under-investment in a direct way. It is about the size of R&D and capital 
expenditures. Both R&D and capital expenditures involve an intertemporal choice problem. In 
both cases, payoffs are unlikely to occur in the immediate future.6 Ceteris paribus, more long-
term oriented firms should use lower discount rates when evaluating investment decisions and 
therefore have higher R&D and capital expenditures than other firms. Based on our arguments in 
the preceding subsections on the differences between family and non-family firms, the following 
two hypotheses should hold: 
Hypothesis 1. R&D expenditures are higher in family than in non-family firms. 
Hypothesis 2. Capital expenditures are higher in family than in non-family firms. 
Most of the empirical literature concerns this particular aspect of long-term orientation. Reflect-
ing some of the criticism of using the size of R&D spending as a measure for long-term behavior 
(e.g., Laverty, 1993), we also compare the determinants of R&D and capital expenditures in fam-
ily firms to those in non-family firms. This aspect is much less analyzed in the literature. In par-
                                                 
6  The only difference is that payoffs from R&D expenditures are likely to be more risky than payoffs from capital 
expenditures. 
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ticular, we are interested in the role of cash flow on the firms’ R&D and investment strategies.7 
We hypothesize that the impact of cash flow on the size of R&D or capital expenditures is lower 
for more long-term oriented firms8. The idea behind this hypothesis is that more long-term ori-
ented firms adjust their business strategy to fluctuations in cash flow to a lower degree. With 
regard to family and non-family firms, the following two hypotheses should hold: 
Hypothesis 3. The impact of cash flow on R&D expenditures is lower in family than in 
non-family firms. 
Hypothesis 4. The impact of cash flow on capital expenditures is lower in family than in 
non-family firms. 
In our arguments about differences between family and non-family firms, we differentiate be-
tween family firms led by family managers and family firms led by professional non-family 
managers. We do not formulate a hypothesis about this subject, because predictions from theory 
are not clear. 
DATA AND METHOD 
In this section, we describe the construction of our estimation sample, the measures we use to 
test our hypotheses, and the Bayesian regression technique applied. 
Sample Construction and Definition of a Family Firm 
For our study, we use the Standard & Poors 500 (as of July 31, 2003) as a starting point to con-
struct our sample. This particular date is chosen since an issue of BusinessWeek indicates the 
                                                 
7  The impact of financial constraints on R&D and investment is analyzed, to some extent, in the finance and 
economics literature. For a summary, see Hall (2005). 
8  For a similar argument, see Hall, Mairesse, Branstetter, and Crepon (1999), who found that cash flow impacts 
on R&D and investment expenditures are much larger in the U.S. than in France or Japan. 
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family firms in the S&P 500 at this date (BusinessWeek, 2003). This publication is helpful as it 
gives qualitative information about the ownership structure and the management composition of 
the 177 family firms covered. As we want to analyze the determinants of R&D expenditures, we 
exclude firms which do not belong to one of the following six industries: chemical and allied 
products (SIC 28), industrial machinery and equipment (SIC 35), electronic and other electrical 
equipment (SIC 36), transportation equipment (SIC 37), instruments and related products (SIC 
38), and business services (SIC 73).9 To construct a panel data set, we then manually collected 
data about the companies’ ownership structures and management compositions from corporate 
proxy statements submitted to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission in the years 1994-
2003.10 Furthermore, we checked and expanded our data with information from Hoover’s Hand-
book of American Business, Gale Business Resources, the twentieth century American Business 
Leaders Database at Harvard Business School, Forbes Lists of 400 Richest Americans, Marquis 
Who’s Who in America, and information available on the companies’ websites. To get the final 
estimation sample, two further steps of data-cleaning were made: first, we restricted our sample 
to the years 1994-199911 because we do not want to confound our findings with the 2000-2002 
stock market crash, which affected technology firms particularly hard. Second, we excluded ob-
servations with negative cash flow in the year before R&D and capital expenditures are meas-
ured.12 Our final estimation sample covers 639 observations from 153 firms. 
The definition of a family firm is a complex issue and involves very different aspects, 
ranging from management composition, ownership structure, and company age to corporate cul-
ture. Klein, Astrachan, and Smyrnios (2000) propose and test the application of a scale that as-
                                                 
9  347 firms were excluded. 
10  Mostly, this information was found in the definitive proxy statement (DEF 14A). The Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934 requires officers, directors, and five percent owners to disclose their holdings.  
11  628 observations were excluded. 
12  25 observations were excluded. 
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sesses the extent and quality of family influence via the three dimensions “power”, “experience”, 
and “culture.” In our study, we focus on the “power” dimension and classify a firm as a family 
firm when either the founding family owns more than 5% of voting stock or a member of the 
founding family is either CEO or chairman of the company (this is a broad definition). To test 
the robustness of our results, we also used a narrower definition, in which a firm is classified as a 
family firm when the founding family owns at least 5% of voting stock and a member of the 
founding family is either CEO or chairman of the company.13 Individuals are members of the 
founding family if they are either the founder themselves, or if they are related to the founder by 
kinship. Information about kinship is from Hoover’s Handbook of American Business, Gale 
Business Resources, Marquis Who’s Who in America, and the companies themselves. Our 
means of classifying family and non-family firms is comparable to Anderson and Reeb (2003) or 
Villalonga and Amit (2006). Not surprisingly, the resulting classification is also very much com-
parable. With the broad definition of a family firm, about 40% of the observations in our sample 
belong to family firms (255 observations); with the narrow definition of a family firm, this share 
reduces to 10.95% (70 observations). Table 1 summarizes our final estimation sample by indus-
try affiliation and type of firm (i.e., family or non-family). 
---------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
---------------------- 
Measures 
The following measures are used as the study’s variables. Except for the variables family firm 
and company age, all other data is from COMPUSTAT. The two dependent variables R&D or 
capital expenditures are measured as the ratio of R&D expenditures to assets or capital expendi-
                                                 
13  By comparing the robustness of the results of our analysis with regard to the definition of a family firm, we may 
learn something about the effect of the family being a member of the firm’s management. 
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tures to assets. Cash flow is calculated as the ratio of cash flow to assets. As we intend to meas-
ure the firm’s internally generated funds before payment of dividends, it is constructed as the 
sum of after-tax income, depreciation, and after-tax R&D (R&D expenditures regression) or af-
ter-tax income, depreciation and capital expenditures (capital expenditures regression) (Hall, 
1992; Grabowski & Vernon, 2000). Market-to-book ratio is calculated as the market value of 
equity at the end of the year plus the book value of debt divided by the book value of total assets. 
Firm size is measured as the book value of total assets. Leverage is determined by dividing the 
book value of debt with the book value of total assets. Two-digit SIC codes are used to construct 
indicator variables for the six industries in our sample. As the distributions of the variables firm 
size and company age are skewed, logarithmic values are taken. Except for the variable company 
age as well as industry and time dummies, all other covariates are lagged by one year. This way, 
we avoid problems of endogeneity. Table 2 describes the variables in more detail. 
---------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
---------------------- 
Bayesian Regression 
Our hypotheses are tested using Bayesian methods. Bayesian methods rely on Bayes’ theorem of 




yy θθθ = ,     (1) 
where θ  represents the set of unknown parameters, and y  represents the data. )Pr(θ is the prior 
distribution of the parameter θ , that may be derived from theory, expert opinion, or other exter-
nal resources. )|Pr( θy  is the likelihood function, which is the probability of the data y  given 
the unknown parameter θ . )Pr(y  is the marginal distribution of the data y , and finally, 
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)|Pr( yθ  represents the posterior distribution, which is the probability of the parameter θ  given 
the data y . Equation (1) may also be written as 
)Pr()|Pr()|Pr( θθθ yy ∝ ,      (2) 
where ∝  means “proportional to”. In words: “the posterior distribution is proportional to the 
likelihood function times the prior distribution.” In Bayesian analysis, interpretation comes from 
the posterior distribution, which states whether a particular parameter value is likely. This way, 
Bayesian methods are useful for testing theory. When testing a hypothesized relationship be-
tween two variables, Bayesian analysis proceeds in the following steps: first, a priori beliefs 
(from theory or other external resources) about the relationship of interest are formulated (the 
prior distribution, )Pr(θ ). Next, a probability of occurrence of the data given these a priori be-
liefs is assumed (the likelihood function, )|Pr( θy ). In a second step, data is used to update these 
beliefs. The result is the posterior distribution, )|Pr( yθ . This posterior distribution gives a prob-
ability density function of the relationship between these two variables. That is, it allows for 
statements in terms of likely and unlikely parameter values. This highlights the fundamental dif-
ference between classical and Bayesian econometrics. Bayesian econometrics does not assume 
that there are true and fixed coefficients. Instead, parameters are regarded as being stochastic. 
In recent years, Bayesian methods have become increasingly prevalent in econometric 
analysis.14 First applied in macroeconomics and decision theory, Bayesian methods have found 
their way to other social sciences, particularly with applications in marketing research.15 Few 
Bayesian studies, however, exist in strategy research. A rare example is Hansen, Perry, and 
                                                 
14  See The Economist (2000) for a general discussion of Bayesian methods. 
15  Rossi and Allenby (2003) discuss the potentials of Bayesian statistics in marketing science. 
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Reese (2004) who use a Bayesian approach to operationalize the resource-based view.16 We use 
a Bayesian approach to test our hypotheses for the following two reasons: first, Bayesian meth-
ods offer interpretations which are more intuitive and consistent with management theory. Con-
trary to classical methods, which assume that there are some “true” and non-stochastic coeffi-
cients, Bayesian methods give a region that contains the corresponding coefficient with a certain 
probability. This is useful because models in management research are usually not as omnipotent 
as their counterparts in the natural sciences. A specific theory may not be a valid mechanism to 
describe 100% of the observations; Bayesian analysis states the probability that the particular 
theory describes the data. Second, Bayesian methods have strong small sample properties and are 
relatively robust to problems of multicollinearity (Hahn & Doh, 2006; Leamer, 1973). The rea-
sons are that Bayesian methods do not rely on asymptotic theory17 and allow us to express our 
prior knowledge about the coefficients in the prior distribution. Thus, if the sample is small and 
beforehand we know very little about the data-generating process behind it, we may express this 
uncertainty via a prior distribution with a large variance. The result of the Bayesian estimation, 
the posterior distribution, then says which parameter values are more likely. These advantages 
are not without a cost, however. The results of a Bayesian analysis relies on “subjective” a priori 
beliefs expressed in the prior distribution and the shape of the likelihood function (Rossi & Al-
lenby, 2003). Therefore, it should be made clear where these beliefs come from and how they 
influence the results. The usual way is to estimate several models with different assumptions 
about prior distributions and a likelihood function and to compare the results. 
We describe the more technical details of our Bayesian analysis in the appendix. For the 
Matlab code used to perform our regressions, please contact the correspondence author. 
                                                 
16  Hahn and Doh (2006) discuss in general the potential for Bayesian methods in strategy research. 
17  Asymptotic theory requires a particular sample size and assumes low levels of correlation between the inde-





In this subsection, we compare family and non-family firms using descriptive statistics. For this 
comparison, the broad definition of a family firm is applied. Table 1, above, shows family and 
non-family firm-year observations by industry association. The overall share of family firm-year 
observations is 39.91%. However, this share varies much by industry, e.g., 61.45% in the busi-
ness services sector versus only 24.24% in the transportation equipment sector. R&D and capital 
expenditures also differ very much by industry; e.g., the median ratio of R&D expenditures to 
assets is 10.58% in the businesses services sector versus only 4.01% in the industrial machinery 
and equipment sector. Table 3 compares family and non-family firms with respect to financial 
performance, R&D and capital expenditures, and the covariates in the regression models. It pre-
sents means, medians, and interquartile ranges of the variables for the two groups. Most distribu-
tions are highly skewed, which is why we use median values and a Wilcoxon rank-sum test to 
compare family and non-family firms. A firm is classified as a family firm if it has more family 
than non-family observations and vice versa; our sample consists of 66 family and 87 non-family 
firms. Family and non-family firms differ to a large degree in their characteristics. Family firms 
have a higher pretax return on assets; the median for family firms is 14.77% versus 10.61% for 
non-family firms (p < 1%). Yet, there is no significant difference with regard to pretax return on 
equity, which might be explained by the lower level of debt in family firms. Regarding R&D 
expenditures, univariate statistics show family firms to have a higher ratio of R&D expenditures-
to assets (median of 8.93% versus median of 5.41% with p < 1%). However, this preliminary 
result should be interpreted with great caution because the share of family firms is particularly 
high in industries with high levels of R&D spending (e.g., business services or electronic and 
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other electrical equipment, Table 1). Concerning capital expenditures, there seem to be no differ-
ences between family and non-family firms. With regard to the independent variables, the fol-
lowing differences stand out: relative to non-family firms, family firms are on average younger, 
smaller, and associated with a lower level of debt. Further, they are valued higher by the stock 
market, measured as market-to-book ratio (median of 3.42 versus median of 1.71 with p < 1%). 
The ratio of cash flow-to assets is also higher in family than in non-family firms (median of 
18.55% versus median of 13.87% with p < 1%). To summarize, the univariate statistics show 
that family and non-family firms differ strongly, which reveals the necessity to control for these 
differences in the multivariate analysis as well as by using panel data, which enables controlling 
for unobserved heterogeneity by using a fixed-effects specification. Table 4 shows some more 
characteristics of the family firms in our estimation sample. 
---------------------- 
Insert Tables 3 and 4 about here 
---------------------- 
Regression Results 
Table 5 and 6 show the results of our Bayesian regression analyses on R&D expenditures to as-
sets and capital expenditures to assets, respectively. 
---------------------- 
Insert Tables 5 and 6 about here 
---------------------- 
 Hypotheses 1-2. Hypothesis 1 states that the size of R&D expenditures is positively re-
lated to a firm being a family firm; hypothesis 2 asserts that capital expenditures are higher in 
family than in non-family firms. To test these two hypotheses, we estimated two regressions with 
the ratio of R&D expenditures to assets or capital expenditures to assets as dependent variables 
and the independent variables as shown in Tables 5 and 6, respectively. As outlined above, the 
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result of a Bayesian regression is a distribution function of each parameter in the regression 
model. We report the median values of these distributions as well as the probability that the pa-
rameter is positive. Overall, we find mixed evidence that hypothesis 1 or hypothesis 2 is true. 
When using the broad definition of a family firm, neither hypothesis 1 nor hypothesis 2 is sup-
ported. Controlling for the particularities of family firms such as a younger age, a lower level of 
debt, and a smaller firm size, the coefficient of the variable family firm is more likely to be nega-
tive than positive. The median coefficient of the variable “family firm” in the R&D expenditures 
to assets regression is -0.0178; the probability of a positive effect is 6.61% (Table 5). The me-
dian coefficient in the capital expenditures to assets regression is -0.0103; the probability of a 
positive effect is 6.78% (Table 6). This result changes, however, when the more narrow defini-
tion of a family firm is applied. With this more narrow definition, the probability of a positive 
effect is 90.68% (R&D expenditures regression) or 64.50% (Capital expenditures regression). 
Possible explanations for the mixed support of our hypotheses are presented in the discussion 
section. Figure 1 displays the entire distribution functions of the variable family firm (broad defi-
nition) graphically. 
---------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
---------------------- 
 Hypotheses 3-4. Hypothesis 3 states that the impact of cash flow on R&D expenditures is 
lower in family relative to non-family firms; hypothesis 4 states that the impact of cash flow on 
capital expenditures is lower in family versus non-family firms. To test these two hypotheses, we 
included an interaction term “family firm X cash flow” in the regression models (see Tables 5 and 
6). A negative sign of the coefficient that belongs to this interaction term is interpreted as posi-
tive evidence for our hypotheses. To ensure that this effect is not due to younger age, smaller 
 24
size, or lower level of debt of family firms relative to non-family firms, we also included a num-
ber of other interaction terms. Overall, we find strong evidence that both R&D and capital ex-
penditures are determined to a lower degree by variations of cash flow in family firms relative to 
non-family firms. The median coefficients of these interaction terms are -0.0407 (R&D expendi-
tures regression) or -0.0622 (capital expenditures regression); the corresponding probabilities of 
a positive effect are 18.29% or 1.43%. Figure 2 shows the entire distribution functions. The use 
of the more narrow definition of a family firm does not change the results (see Tables 5 and 6). 
Figure 2 displays the entire distribution functions of the variable family firm (broad definition) 
graphically. 
---------------------- 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
---------------------- 
Limitations 
Our data suffers from some limitations that might limit generalizations stemming from our re-
sults with regard to the universe of all family firms. First, we cover only large publicly listed 
U.S. firms in the years 1994-1999. Our findings do not necessarily apply to small or not publicly 
listed family firms. Second, most of the family firms in our sample are rather young; in 43% of 
all family firms, the founder is still the CEO (Table 3). The mechanisms might be different in 
multi-generation family firms. It should be noted, however, that our data is very much compara-
ble to Andersen and Reeb (2003) as well as Villalonga and Amit (2006), two highly cited studies 
in the field of family business research. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Little quantitative research exists on why family firms might show a different performance than 
non-family firms. From a theory perspective, a stronger long-term orientation is considered a 
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competitive advantage of family firms relative to non-family firms (e.g., Andersen & Reeb, 
2003; James, 1999; Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2005; Le Breton-Miller & Miller, 2006). In our 
study, we analyze this proposition in detail. We use panel data from large U.S. technology firms 
to study the R&D and investment behavior of family firms relative to non-family firms. The re-
sults are mixed, however. 
Evaluation of Results 
Hypothesis 1-2. When using the broad definition of a family firm, both hypothesis 1 and 
hypothesis 2 are not supported. We find no evidence that family firms have higher R&D or capi-
tal expenditures than non-family firms. When using the narrow definition of a family firm, this 
result changes in that we find strong support for hypothesis 1 and weak support for hypothesis 2. 
It seems that the posited theory is not true for all types of family firms; being a family firm is not 
always positively associated with long-term orientation. For example, our findings suggest that 
long-term orientation is much stronger when the family firm is managed by a family member. 
This finding can be explained as follows: when the owning family leaves the management of the 
firm, the family regards its stake in the firm more like a financial investment, rather than as a part 
of the family identity. Like other financial investors, the family then wants to see strong (short-
term) results. Another explanation would be managerial opportunism on the side of the profes-
sional non-family manager; the professional non-family manager wants to use strong short-term 
results as a signaling device for his or her management quality. Another argument supporting the 
managerial opportunism argument is that family firms are also fertile for conflicts, such as sib-
ling rivalries or conflicts between two family generations (e.g., Harvey & Evans, 1994; Eddle-
ston & Kellermanns, 2007). The management of these conflicts might distract the family owners 
from effectively monitoring the non-family manager. Generally, our results are in line with Kets 
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de Vries (1993), who compares professional non-family with family CEOs and finds the latter 
are “ not haunted by quarterly results” […] and “are more wiling to plow profits back into the 
business” (Kets de Vries, 1993: 62). 
Hypothesis 3-4. Both hypothesis 3 and hypothesis 4 are strongly supported by our data. 
We find strong evidence that the size of R&D and capital expenditures is less determined by 
variations of cash flow in family firms relative to non-family firms. Our interpretation is that 
family firms are more able or more willing to withstand pressures to cut R&D or capital expendi-
tures when cash flow is tight. A family firm seems to adjust to a lower degree its business strat-
egy to its cash flow situation. This behavior might be explained by a different set of priorities of 
family firms relative to non-family firms (e.g., Casson, 1999; Tagiuri & Davis, 1992). The long-
term existence of the firm and its products seems to matter more than strong short-term results 
published in annual or quarterly financial reports. 
Management theory. For management theory, our results have some important implica-
tions: first, although theory offers many explanations why family firms might follow a more 
long-term oriented strategy, our empirical findings are mixed. It seems that family firms do not 
follow per se a more long-term oriented strategy. Our results suggest that, in fact, some family 
firms invest less on long-term projects. It seems that the degree of long-term orientation depends 
on the family being present in the management of the firm. Moreover, it seems that family firms 
to a lower degree adapt their strategy to their financial situation, which might be interpreted as a 
particular aspect of long-term orientation. A broader discussion on what actually constitutes a 
long-term oriented business strategy, how such a strategy is related to family firm characteristics, 
and how it can be measured seems fruitful. Another important result from the perspective of 
management theory is that we find evidence for the validity of the managerial opportunism (Na-
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rajan, 1985; Hirshleifer & Thakor, 1992) explanation for managerial myopia. Long-term orienta-
tion was particularly strong when the interests of ownership and management were aligned. Cor-
respondingly, our findings do not support the fluid and impatient capital explanation (Porter, 
1992) for managerial myopia. Family-owned firms are not always found to invest more in long-
term projects. 
Practical Implications 
The results of our study (in particular our findings with regard to hypothesis 3 and 4) have some 
practical implications for non-family shareholders and other stakeholders in family firms. 
Non-family shareholders. Our results show that the R&D or investment strategies in 
family firms are determined to a lower degree by variations in cash flow than is the case in non-
family firms. For non-family shareholders in family firms, this has two main implications: first, 
managerial behavior is more easily predictable; the management of a family firm is unlikely to 
change the R&D or investment strategy when the company is in financial distress. Second, short-
term-oriented investors will find it hard to convince the management of a family firm to pay out 
dividends which would lead to a reduction of the firm’s R&D or investment budget. 
Other stakeholders. By other stakeholders, we mean employees, important suppliers, 
large customers or the local community. They are affected by the firm’s strategic choices, but are 
not owners of the firm in a legal sense. Our result that family firms adapt their R&D and invest-
ment strategy to a relatively low degree to variations in cash flow is important news to them. 
Members of these groups are less likely to lose their relationship-specific investments under-
taken. For example, in times of financial distress, employees in R&D departments should be less 
afraid to lose their job; similarly, suppliers who have a R&D cooperation with the firm should be 
less concerned about the future of their cooperation. Hence, for stakeholders, it is a relatively 
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low-risk strategy to invest in a relationship with a family firm. This is particularly relevant for 
stakeholders who have the discretion to invest in both family and non-family firms (e.g., impor-
tant suppliers, the local community, and cooperating universities). 
Future Research 
Our study suggests at least three opportunities for future research. One avenue would be to look 
more closely at the different types of family firms that exist. Our dataset is confined to large pub-
licly-listed U.S. firms, which is not representative of all firms. Questions worth analyzing are: Is 
there a difference in long-term orientation between private and publicly listed family firms? How 
long-term-oriented is a family firm when there is a conflict within the owning family? Another 
avenue of research might focus on other aspects of long-term orientation such as investment in 
long-term relationships with employees, clients or the local community (Le Breton-Miller & 
Miller, 2006). Lastly, a third avenue would be to relate differences in long-term orientation be-
tween family and non-family firms to differences in financial performance. 
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APPENDIX 
Detailed Description of Bayesian Analysis 
For the prior distribution of the individual effects, we choose a uniform distribution. This corre-
sponds to a fixed-effects model specification in classical econometrics. For the coefficients, we 
assume a normally distributed prior with a mean of zero for all coefficients. Such a prior specifi-
cation would imply that our model has no explanatory power at all, which one may interpret as a 
prior specification against the theory developed in the text. This ensures that any evidence for the 
validity of our theory is not induced by the specification of the prior. Furthermore, our particular 
prior specification ensures that the posterior distributions functions are identifiable, i.e. we do not 
end up with a flat posterior distribution (Koop, 2003, p. 291). Finally, the prior of the variance is 
assumed to follow a χ2 distribution, which is consistent with the assumption of normally distrib-
uted error terms. 
As a check of the robustness of the results, we also estimated our model with different 
prior specifications. We allowed for different means and variances in the normal distribution and 
for different classes of distributions such as a uniform distribution. Regardless of the prior speci-
fications chosen, we obtained basically the same results. 
For the estimation, we used a Matlab code which takes 10,000 draws from the posterior 
distribution. As the estimation ends up in a multidimensional posterior distribution, we applied 
the Gibbs Sampler to arrive at the corresponding univariate distributions of the coefficients 




Family and Non-family Firms by Industrya 
 
SIC 










Obs. of  
Family Firms 
       
28 Chemical and  allied products 4.70% 5.46% 43 Obs. 105 Obs. 29.05% 
35 Industrial machinery  and equipment 4.01% 5.75% 40 Obs. 73 Obs. 35.40% 
36 Electronic and  other electrical equipment 8.06% 8.26% 72 Obs. 66 Obs. 52.17% 
37 Transportation equipment 2.84% 4.55% 16 Obs. 50 Obs. 24.24% 
38 Instruments and  related products 6.26% 4.25% 33 Obs. 58 Obs. 36.26% 
73 Business services 10.58% 3.85% 51 Obs. 32 Obs. 61.45% 
    255 Obs. 384 Obs. 39.91% 
       
a The broad definition of a family firm is applied. 
 
TABLE 2 
Description of Variables 
 
Variables Description  
  
R&D/assets R&D expenditures (in million $) divided by total assets (in million $)  
Capital expendi-
tures/assets Capital expenditures (in million $) divided by total assets (in million $)  
Family firm * Dummy = 1 if family owns more than 5% of voting stock or either CEO or chairman is 
from family [broad definition] 
 
Dummy = 1 if family owns more than 5% of voting stock and either CEO or chairman is 
from family [narrow definition] 
Cash flow/assets * In R&D regressions: sum of after-tax income, depreciation and after-tax R&D divided by 
total assets 
In capital expenditures regressions: sum of after-tax income, depreciation and capital ex-
penditures divided by total assets 
Market-to-book ratio * Sum of market value of equity (in million $) and book value of debt (in million $) divided 
by book value of total assets (in million $) 
Firm size * Log (total assets) 
Leverage * Long-term debt (in million $) divided by total assets (in million $) 
Age of company Log (number of years the company exists) 
Industry dummies Dummy variables indicating observations in either SIC industry 28, 35, 36, 37, 38 or 73 
Time dummies Dummy variables indicating year of observation (1995-1999) 
 
* To avoid problems of endogeneity in the multivariate analysis, these variables are lagged by one year. 
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TABLE 3 
Comparison of Family and Non-family Firms a 
 
 Non-family Firms (N= 87)  Family Firms (N= 66)   
















               
Pretax return 
on assets (in %) 
 
11.40 7.81 5.96 10.61 16.50  15.72 10.45 9.07 14.77 22.90  0.40 % 0.42% 
Pretax return 
on equity  
(in %) 
 









6.44 3.37 4.37 5.69 7.69  6.17 3.97 3.29 5.43 7.87  64.46% 25.96% 
Cash flow/ 
assets b, c 
(in %) 
 




2.28 1.72 1.13 1.71 2.78  4.39 4.73 2.18 3.42 5.45  < 0.1% < 0.1% 
Firm size b, 
(in bn $) 
 




20.56 12.66 11.19 19.30 29.67  13.29 15.65 0.41 7.92 18.31  0.18% < 0.1% 
Age of com-
pany b 
(in years)  
 
70.43 44.81 20.5 76.5 100  33.30 36.31 13.5 18.5 40.5  < 0.1% < 0.1% 
 
a Data for the univariate statistics are based on time series averages for each firm, and then averages were taken across firms. A firm is classified as a family firm if it has more family than  
  non-family observations and vice versa. The broad definition of a family firm is used.  
b These variables are lagged by one year. The reason is that they go into the multivariate analyses as lagged values. 
c Computed in the way the variable goes into the R&D regression (see Table 2).  
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TABLE 4 
Characteristics of Family Firm Observations in the Estimation Sample (N=255) a  
 
      
Firm Governance      
      
Family owns more than 5% of voting stock 51.76%     
Family owns more than 20% of voting stock 18.04%     
CEO belongs to family 65.1%     
Chairman belongs to family 70.2%     
CEO or chairman belongs to family  76.86%     
Family owns more than 5% of voting stock and 
CEO or chairman belongs to family (narrow definition) 27.45% 
    
Founder is CEO 43.53%     
Founder is chairman 49.02%     
Founder is CEO or chairman 54.51%     
CEO is chairman 73.33%     
      
Firm Characteristics Mean S.D. Median Min. Max. 
      
Company age (in years) 39.35 38.88 22 3 197 
Total assets (in bn $) 10.39 36.58 1.77 0.15 279.10 
Sales (in bn $) 7.95 21.94 1.45 0.04 162.56 
Employees (in 1,000) 24.25 55.32 6.93 0.16 371.70 
 




Results of Bayesian Regression Analyses on R&D/Assets a, b 
 












Probability of  
positive marginal 
effect  
      
Industry dummies included as control variables; not reported  included as control variables; not reported 
Time dummies included as control variables; not reported  included as control variables; not reported 
Family firm t-1  -0.0178 6.61%  0.0097 90.68% 
(Cash flow/assets) t-1 -0.1549 40.84%  -0.5089 23.20% 
Firm size t-1 0.0061 82.82%  0.0044 75.27% 
Leverage t-1 0.0245 81.69%  0.0149 70.82% 
Age of company 0.1056 87.24%  0.1115 89.91% 
Market-to-book ratio t-1 -0.1321 0%  -0.1313 0% 
(Cash flow/assets) t-1  x  family firm t-1  -0.0407 18.29%  -0.0963 1.84% 
(Cash flow/assets) t-1  x  control variables c included as control variables; not reported  included as control variables; not reported 
 
a   N=639 Observations including 255 family firm observations (broad definition) or 70 family firm observations (narrow definition), respectively 
b   We use normally distributed priors with of mean of zero and a standard deviation of one.  
The use of alternative priors however does not change the results in a substantial way. 
c   Control variables: (cash flow/assets) x market-to-book ratio, (cash flow/assets) x leverage, (cash flow/assets) x age of company,  





Results of Bayesian Regression Analyses on Capital Expenditures/Assets a, b 
 










Probability of  
positive marginal 
effect  
      
Industry dummies included as control variables; not reported  included as control variables; not reported 
Time dummies included as control variables; not reported  included as control variables; not reported 
Family firm t-1 -0.0103 6.78%  0.0028 64.50% 
(Cash flow/assets) t-1 0.0028 50.46%  0.2335 85.20% 
Firm size t-1 0.0005 55.69%  0.0005 56.90% 
Leverage t-1 -0.0034 44.21%  -0.0119 31.42% 
Age of company 0.0372 100.00%  0.0366 100.% 
Market-to-book ratio t-1 0.0331 99.47%  0.0313 99.40% 
(Cash flow/assets) t-1  x  family firm t-1 -0.0622 1.43%  -0.0729 3.17% 
(Cash flow/assets) t-1  x  control variables c included as control variables; not reported  included as control variables; not reported 
 
a   N=639 Observations including 255 family firm observations (broad definition) or 70 family firm observations (narrow definition), respectively 
b   We use normally distributed priors with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one.  
The use of alternative priors however does not change the results in a substantial way. 
c   Control variables: (cash flow/assets) x market-to-book ratio, (cash flow/assets) x leverage, (cash flow/assets) x age of company,  




Distribution of Marginal Effect of Family Firm a 
 
R&D Expenditures Regression (Table 5) Capital Expenditures Regression (Table 6) 
 
a The broad definition of a family firm is applied.  
FIGURE 2 
Distribution of Marginal Effect of Family Firm x (Cash Flow/Assets) a 
 
R&D Expenditures Regression (Table 5) Capital Expenditures Regression (Table 6) 
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